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CIVIL PROCEDURE: ATTORNEY FEES AS SPECIAL DAMAGES 
 
Summary 
 
 The Court clarified two issues: (1) Sandy Valley Associates v. Sky Ranch Estates Owners 
Association’s2 and Horgan v. Felton’s3 effect on the law regarding the recovery of attorney fees 
as special damages; and (2) the extent to which Horgan retreated from Sandy Valley’s discussion 
about the grounds for recovering attorney fees as special damages.  
 
Disposition 
  
 The decision in Horgan v. Felton
4
 should not be read to mean that a party in any matter 
that relates to real property must prevail on a slander of title claim in order to recover attorney 
fees as special damages. Rather, Horgan only applies in a special type of civil action that is 
brought by a party: an action to clarify or remove a cloud on title.
5
 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
The Plaintiff purchased a home from developer Christopher Homes Ridges, LLC 
(“CHR”) pursuant to a contract (“the Agreement”) wherein CHR agreed to covey good 
marketable title to the Plaintiff at the close of escrow.  
CHR hired Christopher Homes, LLC (“CH”) as a general contractor who subsequently 
hired K&D Construction (K&D) as a subcontractor for various services. CHR failed to timely or 
fully pay K&D and as a result K&D recorded a lien on various properties, one of which was the 
Plaintiff’s.  
K&D filed a civil suit against CHR, CH and the Plaintiff to recover on the liens through 
foreclosure. In answer, the Plaintiff filed a cross-claim against CHR for a breach of contract 
claim. Under this claim, the Plaintiff tried to recover attorney fees and costs that she allegedly 
incurred in defending herself against K&D’s action.  
The district court relied on Horgan and found that, as a matter of law, the Plaintiff could 
not recover attorney fees as special damages because she did not prove slander of title. As a 
result, the Plaintiff filed an appeal challenging the district court’s determinations regarding the 
recovery of attorney fees as special damages. 
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Discussion 
 The Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in its reading of Horgan in favor of CHR 
arguing that it does not bar a party from recovering attorney fees as special damages when the 
civil action incidentally pertains to title to real property. Instead, the Plaintiff asserted Horgan 
only prohibits a grant of attorney fees that stem from an action in which a claimant tries to 
remove a cloud on title but fails to prove slander of title. Next, the plaintiff asserted the 
attorney’s fees as special damages sought did not arise from an action to remove a cloud on title 
but rather from CHR's breach of contract. Liu then argues that Sandy Valley permits the recovery 
of attorney fees as special damages that arise from a breach of contract and thus her attorney fees 
claim was not barred as a matter of law. The Court reviewed the legal issued presented by these 
arguments de novo.
6
  
 
Horgan's partial abrogation of Sandy Valley  
 
 The Court first pointed out that attorney fees are generally not recoverable “absent 
authority under a statute, rule, or contract.”7 However, “as an exception to the general rule,” 
attorney fees may be awarded “as special damages in limited circumstances.”8  
 Next the court summarized the three significant statements that are found in Sandy Valley 
which concern the grounds for recovering attorney fees as special damages.
9
 First, attorney fees 
may be recovered as special damages if they are pleaded according to NRCP 9(g) and are a 
“natural and proximate consequence of the injurious conduct.”10 Second, the court stated that 
attorney fees are recoverable as special damages when they arise from a third-party legal dispute 
as a result of a breach of contract.
11
 Third, the Sandy Valley court stated that in actions 
concerning a cloud on title to real property “[a]ttorney fees may . . . be awarded as damages in 
those cases in which a party incurred the fees . . . in clarifying or removing a cloud upon the title 
to property.”12 
 Next, the Court went on to discuss how the Horgan court revisited Sandy Valley and 
retreated from the third statement above that concerns an award of attorney fees in cloud-on-title 
actions.
13
 There, the court stated “in cases concerning title to real property, attorney fees are 
only allowable as special damages in slander of title actions, not merely when a cloud on the title 
to real property exists.”14 The Court did not read this statement to the exclusion of the rest of the 
opinion.
15
 Rather, the Court analyzed the remainder of the Horgan opinion, and found that it is 
clear the case did not hold that a party in any matter that relates to title to real property must 
prevail on a slander of title claim in order to recover attorney fees as special damages.
16
 Rather, 
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that the Horgan court specifically referred to actions meant only to clarify or remove a cloud-on-
title.
17
  
 In such circumstances, the Court concluded that a “plaintiff may recover as damages the 
expense of legal proceedings necessary to remove a cloud on the plaintiff’s title” when he or she 
prevails on a slander of title claim.
18
 The Horgan court came to this conclusion by primarily 
relying upon authorities that permit the award of attorney fees as special damages to parties who 
brought claims to clarify or remove a cloud on title, accrued attorney fees in bringing those 
claims, and prevailed on a slander of title claim.
19
 Thus, the Horgan court’s holding applies to 
actions where a plaintiff seeks recovery of attorney fees that were accrued from pursuing an 
action to clarify or remove a cloud-on-title. Moreover, the Horgan court was not concluding that 
a slander of title claim is a prerequisite to recovering attorney fees as special damages in all civil 
actions that relate to title to real property.
20
 Rather, it is only a prerequisite to a party’s recovery 
of attorney fees that were sustained in asserting claims to clarify or remove a cloud-on-title, such 
as declaratory or equitable relief claims.
21
 
In the present case, the Court pointed out that the Plaintiff incurred attorney fees by 
defending against K&D’s civil action that was a result of CHR’s breach of the Agreement not 
from a claim seeking declaratory or equitable relief. Therefore, the Court agreed with the 
Plaintiff’s argument in that the attorney fees claim asserted by the Plaintiff was not in the 
purview of Horgan’s requirement that a party who brought an action to clarify or remove a 
cloud-on-title must prove slander of title in order to recover the attorney fees that he or she 
incurred in the action.
22
 
 
The portion of Sandy Valley that Horgan did not overturn  
 
Finally, in light of the above discussion, the Court held that it maintained that “a party to 
a contract may recover from a breaching party the attorney fees that arise from the breach that 
caused the former party to accrue attorney fees in defending himself or herself against a third 
party’s legal action.” Specifically, the Court found that the Horgan decision did not retreat from 
Sandy Valley’s conclusion on the first and second statements referenced above. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In the present case, the Court held that Sandy Valley permits, and Horgan does not bar, 
Liu’s claim to recover attorney fees as special damages that were purportedly sustained in 
defending herself against K&D’s suit, which was allegedly caused by CHR’s breach of the 
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Agreement. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court’s findings of fact, conclusions of 
law and judgment on Liu’s claim and remanded the matter for further proceedings.23  
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  The Court also instructed the district court to make a determination on whether the evidence before it proved that 
CHR’s breach of the Agreement caused Liu to accumulate the attorney fees in defending her interest against K&D’s 
suit. This was a question of fact that was inappropriate to determine for the first time on appeal.  
